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The short answer is “yes” for the most
part with respect to customer assets held in
a customer segregated account in the United
States but major changes to the procedures
and policies now in place are needed to provide greater customer protection safeguards,
especially in connection with assets held outside the United States in CFTC Regulation
30.71 secured amount accounts, regarding
trading on non-U.S. futures exchanges.
Most mystery authors normally wait until the last few pages of the last chapter to
provide the final clues and solve the mystery. This is, however, a different mystery
story even if it’s filled with suspense, exciting
themes and horror. And for those who do
not believe that the role that segregated and
secured amount funds play in today’s global
futures markets is not mysterious and challenging, then they must have slept through
the period of the last two weeks in September
and most of October. What we all believed
were the rules to be applied in the event of
an FCM’s bankruptcy were all interpreted
differently by the various global exchanges
and clearing houses. Some clearing houses,

like EUREX Clearing AG, LCH Clearnet
SA, the CME Clearing House, ICE Clear US
and The Clearing Corporation, acted admirably and professionally while others acted
in a manner that was not necessarily in the
best interests of futures customers.2 This
article will explain what many of us in the
futures industry understand to be the role
of customer segregated and secured amount
accounts, then explain what occurred after
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the parent
company of Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”),
filed for Chapter 11 protection and then
provide several recommendations of best
practices that this global industry should
now consider. Since the brokerage firms today are truly global in their customer and
product base, any future solution must be a
global approach.
CONTINUED ON PAGE 3
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Introduction
With the demise of Bear Stearns Securities
(“Bear”) in March 2008 and now the bankruptcy
of LBI, many futures customers have raised serious questions and concerns regarding how and
whether their funds held by a futures commission merchant (“FCM”) are protected under such
circumstances.3 Similarly, given the recent credit
crisis, the government loans provided to American International Group (“AIG”), the acquisition
of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, the $700
billion bailout approved by Congress and numerous other financial-related matters, customers of
broker-dealers (“BD”), insurance companies and
banks have raised similar concerns. Not to underestimate the importance of insolvencies involving these other financial institutions, this article
will only address the laws, regulations and policies that impact futures customers globally under
such circumstances.4

Rules Governing Futures Accounts
at an FCM
Substantial financial safeguards and customer
protections exist within the futures industry that
are designed to protect customer funds in the
event of an FCM bankruptcy. Assets held in a futures account at an FCM are protected and governed specifically by applicable laws and CFTC
regulations that require the segregation of cash
and collateral deposited by customers in conjunction with their futures trading. Pursuant to the
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”)5 and applicable CFTC regulations6, an FCM, must maintain
its futures customer assets in at least two different
types of customer fund accounts (e.g., segregated
and secured amount accounts) and may use a
third type (e.g., a non-regulated account), each of
which have different priority rights in the event of
the FCM’s insolvency.
The three types of customer fund accounts used
by an FCM are:
1. SEGREGATED FUNDS: The first such account, established pursuant to Section 4d(a)
(2) of the CEA7 and CFTC Rule 1.20, is referred to as the “customer segregated funds
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account”. It holds the assets of all customers (U.S. and non-U.S.) deposited in conjunction with transactions on all U.S. futures
markets. All customer assets are required
to be held only in accounts maintained at
custodial banks and other permitted financial institutions, including other FCMs and
clearing houses that are registered with the
CFTC as “derivatives clearing organizations” (DCOs). All customer segregated accounts are required to be clearly identified
as segregated pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.20.
These segregated funds are not permitted to
be commingled with the FCM’s proprietary
funds or used to finance its futures or broker-dealer businesses. The amounts held in
the segregated funds accounts are calculated
daily as required by CFTC Rule 1.32, and
the FCM must take immediate action in the
unlikely event that there is ever a shortfall in
its segregated funds accounts. This daily calculation must be completed by each FCM by
not later than noon on the next business day.
However, the customer segregated required
amount needs to be in a good control location8 the night before. Otherwise, the FCM
is deemed to be “under segregated”, and, if
the FCM is “under-segregated”, this must be
reported promptly to the CFTC and its respective DSRO.9 Given this same-day deposit
requirement, most large FCMs will deposit a
large amount of their own capital in the customer segregated account to ensure that such
accounts are never “under-segregated”. This
capital infusion can amount to several hundred million dollars, depending on the total
amount held in the segregation pool.
2. SECURED AMOUNT FUNDS: The second
type of account, governed by CFTC Rule
30.7, is known as the “customer secured
amount account” and holds the assets of U.S.
residents deposited in conjunction with their
transactions on non-U.S. futures markets.
These funds are also required to be held in
accounts at banks and other permitted financial institutions, including non-U.S. clearing
houses and members of non-U.S. exchanges,
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provided such non-U.S. clearing houses and
non-U.S. member firms are deemed to be a
“good secured” location. Like segregated
funds, secured amount funds are not permitted to be commingled with the FCM’s proprietary assets and are calculated daily and
represent 100% of that day’s customer requirements.10 FCMs are permitted to secure
more than the minimum requirement stated
above and can elect to deposit all funds used
to trade on non-U.S. markets by all of its clients, including foreign domiciled clients. Like
segregated funds as noted above, the calculation for the secured amount requirements
must be completed by the following morning
but the secured amount requirement must be
deposited in a good secured location the night
before or the FCM will be deemed to be in
default.11 As noted above with customer segregated accounts, most large FCMs will also
deposit their own capital in a secured amount
account to prevent any under-funding from
occurring
3. NON-REGULATED FUNDS: The third
type of account, called the “Non-Regulated
Customer Credit” calculation, contains the
assets (cash and open trade equity) of nonU.S. customers deposited in conjunction with
transactions on non-U.S. futures markets if
such amounts are not included in the secured
amount account as noted above.12 An FCM,
also registered as a broker-dealer, may use
this third account type, which is governed
by Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) Rule 15c3-3. The amounts held in
this account reflect the total of the credit balances calculated for each individual account
owed by the FCM to its non-U.S. customers
for transactions on non-U.S. futures markets
less any deposits of cash or securities held
with a clearing organization or correspondent clearing broker.13 Any amounts held in a
non-regulated account are not covered by the
provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”).
Each “bucket”, noted above, contains funds
used by customers to margin the relevant futures
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products, with the difference being whether the
futures products are traded on U.S. or non-U.S.
futures markets and, for non-US markets only,
whether the customer is a U.S. or a non-U.S. entity.
In addition to the segregation and secured
amount requirements, CFTC regulations restrict
where client funds may be placed. CFTC Rule
1.20 requires the FCM to maintain customer
segregated funds, whether in the form of cash or
collateral, either with a clearinghouse of a U.S.
futures exchange registered with the CFTC as a
DCO, in a customer segregated account with a
bank or with another FCM. In connection with
its custodial arrangement, the FCM must obtain
what is known as a “segregation acknowledgement letter”, commonly known as a “seg. waiver
letter”, in which the respective custodial bank or
FCM acknowledges and agrees that all assets deposited in this segregated account are for the sole
benefit of the FCM’s futures customers and are
not subject to the claims of any of the FCM’s creditors, including that bank or FCM, respectively.
Similar letters must also be obtained for the Rule
30.7 secured amount account and the Rule 15c3-3
non-regulated account at the respective custodial
bank. All customer assets are therefore held at all
times in these accounts at the respective custodial
bank or FCM, in accounts at the various clearing
houses or with other clearing brokers that act as
clearing brokers on the various exchanges around
the globe on behalf of the FCM.
RECOMMENDATION #1:
While
the
CFTC does not specifically require the use of
non-regulated accounts, as this is primarily an
SEC requirement for broker-dealers, the CFTC
should now prohibit the use of non-regulated
accounts by an FCM, that is also registered as a
broker-dealer, and require that all funds held by
an FCM to margin non-U.S. futures, whether they
be for the benefit of a U.S. customer or a non-U.S.
customer, be held in a 30.7 Customer Secured
Amount Account. This prohibition will prevent
any misappropriation of futures customer funds
held in a 15c3-3 account as such accounts could
arguably be deemed to fall outside the protections
afforded by CFTC regulations 1.20 and 30.7.
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An FCM is also required by CFTC regulations
to properly account for and calculate on a daily
basis both the amount that it is required to hold in
segregation and the amount that actually is in its
customer segregated accounts.14 Any deficiencies
in the amounts required must be remedied and reported immediately to the appropriate regulators.
Most large FCMs deposit a substantial amount
of their own capital in the customer segregated
account to provide excess funds in the event a futures customer does not timely meet its margin
requirements. This capital infusion may also be
used to satisfy customer claims in the event of
the FCM’s insolvency. Similarly, to provide additional protections to its customers, the FCM
must report, in accordance with applicable CFTC
regulations, to the appropriate regulators within
24 hours if its net capital falls below the “early
warning” level and must promptly add additional
capital to bring its net capital above this level.15
In the event of the FCM’s bankruptcy,16 futures
customer assets are normally protected except as
described below. First, assuming no material futures customer-related default exists or was the
cause of the FCM’s bankruptcy (e.g., the insolvency was the direct result of a non-futures customer or transaction), a bankruptcy filing should
have no material impact on customers’ assets
held in the three aforementioned accounts. Under
such circumstances, each account should contain
100% of the required amounts and should be
transferred back to customers in an orderly fashion. An FCM bankruptcy would be administered
under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
which contains specific provisions for the protection of customers in the event of an FCM’s insolvency. Under Part 190 of the CFTC’s rules, the
bankruptcy trustee would have the responsibility
of returning the custodied assets back to each futures customer. Creditors of the FCM’s bankrupt
estate would have no claim to any of the assets
held in these three accounts. The assets would be
held solely for the benefit of the FCM’s futures
customers.
If, on the other hand, the FCM’s bankruptcy
resulted from a futures customer’s failure to deliver the required margin for its futures trading
positions, and the default was greater than all of
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the shareholder equity of the FCM, then each of
the three accounts held at the custodian bank (or
an FCM) would be treated independently of each
other. Customers’ assets held in one of these three
accounts may not be used to satisfy any shortfalls
in another account (e.g., the amounts held in the
segregated account at the respective custodial bank
or at a DCO may not be used to cover a shortfall
held in the non-regulated account). However, as
noted in greater detail below, a clearing house,
including a DCO, may apply a clearing member
firm’s customer assets that are on deposit with
that respective clearing house to satisfy margin
amounts owed to the clearing house by that clearing member firm (and that clearing member firm
only) for its customer accounts. In other words,
customer assets held by a clearing house may not
be used to cover a shortfall in the FCM’s “house”
account nor may assets held at one clearing house
be applied to cover a shortfall at another clearing
house unless a cross-margining arrangement exists with respect to the two clearing houses.
The assets of an FCM’s futures customers,
which trade on the U.S. futures markets, are normally wired directly by those customers into the
customer segregated account at the respective
custodial bank. The custodian bank would typically maintain different segregated accounts to
hold cash and any non-cash collateral, such as
U.S. Treasury bills, respectively. This firewall between the bank and the FCM provides important
protections to the FCM’s futures customers. As
noted above, the assets held in these accounts at
the bank do not fall within the bankrupt estate
and are reserved for payment to customers if the
FCM files for bankruptcy. If the bank mishandles
futures customers’ assets held with the FCM, its
full shareholder capital should stand behind the
accounts.
If the FCM is required by an exchange to send
cash or collateral to a DCO to meet its customers’ initial or variation margin requirements, the
required amounts are typically sent via wire transfer from the customer segregated account at the
respective custodial bank or FCM to another customer segregated account held in the name of the
DCO for the benefit of the FCM’s futures customers. Therefore, at all times, assets of the FCM’s fu-
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tures customers, who trade on U.S. futures markets, are held in a customer segregated account
at the FCM’s or the DCO’s custodial bank. Similarly, assets that need to be transferred to clearing
brokers or clearing houses outside the U.S. are
also sent directly from the 30.7 Secured Amount
Account at the bank to the required good secured
location.

Investments of Futures Customer
Assets
There are also customer protections relating
to the types of permissible investments that an
FCM may make with customer assets held by the
FCM. Pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.25, the FCM is
permitted to invest its futures customers’ assets in
a limited number of permissible investments.17 In
today’s marketplace, the most commonly used investment product are money market mutual funds
that meet the requirements of CFTC Rule 1.25
and SEC Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”). However, any
investment loss that may be incurred as a result
of such investment must be borne solely by the
FCM; its futures customers assume no such investment risk.18 This concern has been heightened
recently by The Reserve Fund which lost a substantial amount of its investment assets through
its purchase of commercial paper held in the name
of Lehman Brothers and AIG, causing the fund to
“break the buck”.19 Also, the FCM must receive
an acknowledgement from each money market
fund that the amounts invested by the FCM on
behalf of its customers with the respective money
market fund may not be applied to any creditor
of the FCM. This is similar to the segregation
acknowledgement letter received by FCMs from
their custodial banks, as noted above.
RECOMMENDATION #2: Given the recent
issues that have arisen with respect to money
market funds as well as other investments that
are permissible under CFTC Regulation 1.25, the
CFTC should review CFTC Regulation 1.25 and
U.S. clearing houses should review their respective rules regarding deposits made by their clearing member firms, such as the IEF2 Program at the
CME Clearing House, to determine what chang-
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es, if any, are now needed to these regulations and
programs. In particular, they should codify that
any FCM or clearing member firm that invests in
money market funds or other permissible investments under CFTC Regulation 1.25 on behalf of
their futures customers will be held liable for any
losses that may occur from such investments and
should consider setting guidelines relating to such
investments. For example, one such guideline, a
portfolio diversification guideline, may state that
no FCM should invest more than a particular percentage of its customer assets in any one money
market fund or other permissible investment.
Also, the money market funds that can be used
for such investments by FCMs should be required
to accept redemptions on a daily basis and pay
such redemption proceeds within a certain time
frame, e.g., 24 hours, with only one exception
permitted, that is, to do so would cause the fund
to “break the buck”.

Good Risk Management Practices
The risk management disciplines applied by
FCMs and other participants in the futures industry are another significant source of customer
protection. To provide the greatest protection to
its futures customers, the FCM must exercise a
strong risk management practice. This requires
establishing a proper trade or credit risk amount
for each of its client futures accounts, monitoring such levels frequently and receiving current
on-going financial information from each futures
customer. This is especially true for those customers who trade an account (or a combination of accounts pursuant to an aggregation concept) that
results in a large percentage of the open interest
of any single commodity being owned or controlled by a client. Also, while a DCO normally
sets adequate and proper initial margin levels,
typically involving a one day, two standard deviation test, an FCM should also analyze each of its
large futures customers, especially those, as noted
above, who hold positions that represent a large
percentage of the open interest, and apply a more
conservative variation risk (“VAR”) or standard
deviation (“SD”) analysis, such as a five day, two
SD test, on a daily basis.
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If one of the FCM’s customers were to fail to
meet its margin requirements in a timely manner,
which is typically a T+1 standard,20 that FCM
would be required to step in and use its own capital to ensure that other customers are not affected
and to satisfy that FCM’s obligations as a clearing
broker. As noted above, most large FCMs maintain a significant amount of their own capital in
the customer segregated and secured amount accounts to provide a first line of protection in the
event a customer fails to meet its daily margin requirements. Applicable laws and regulations prohibit that FCM from using the assets of its other,
non-defaulting futures customers to meet the obligations of a defaulting client. However, as noted above, this does not prevent a clearing house
from applying assets held in a clearing member’s
customer segregated fund account to cover any
deficit that may result from a shortfall in the customer segregated account held on the books of
that clearing house.

Role of a DCO
DCOs also impose important financial safeguards that are intended to ensure financial safety
to the markets. Let’s assume, for purposes of this
article, that the FCM and its foreign affiliates are
a clearing member of most of the major global
futures exchanges. The exchange clearing house
(referred to in the U.S. as a DCO) stands as the
guarantor between its clearing members and represents the buyer and seller of every futures contract (“the buyer to every seller and the seller to
every buyer”). As such, the clearing houses establish and enforce strict financial requirements for
their clearing members to minimize the likelihood
of, and the consequences of, a default by one of
the parties to a futures transaction.
In the event of a default by a clearing member,
the following resources are typically available to
a DCO. First, the exchange memberships and
shares held by a defaulting clearing member and
all the margin supporting the positions held in its
“house” account at the clearing house may be
used to cover any shortfall in that clearing member firm’s “customer segregated funds” account
at the clearing house. Second, each clearing house
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requires its clearing members to make deposits to
the clearing house’s Guaranty Fund, also known
as a Surety Fund, to provide additional, back-up
capital protections to the clearing house in the
event of a customer default. The amount deposited by each clearing member firm typically is based
on a formula based on the volume and overnight
margin requirements maintained by that clearing
member firm. At the CME Clearing House, the
Guaranty Fund currently totals approximately
US$1,800,000,000. Third, in the unlikely event
that a clearing member were to default and the
proceeds held in the Guaranty Fund were used
to cover a shortfall, the DCO will immediately
take steps to restore its Guaranty Fund to predefault levels. (For example, the CME Clearing
House can require other, non-defaulting clearing
member firms to increase their Guaranty Fund
deposits by as much as 2.75 times the amount
of their security deposits to restore the Fund to
pre-default levels.) In its history, no CME clearing member firm has ever defaulted but these
safeguards are designed to provide financial protections even in times of significant stress in the
financial markets. These protections are further
buttressed by the customer margin requirements
that are established by the futures exchanges and
by the exchanges’ own market surveillance and
financial surveillance programs, all of which provide important customer protections to futures
customers.

Net Capital Requirements
Another customer protection are the financial
net capital requirements imposed on all brokerage firms, including FCMs. The minimum “adjusted net capital” requirement, from an accounting perspective, reflects an amount that equals
the total of the current liquid assets on the books
of the FCM in excess of the total amount of its
liabilities. Most large brokerage firms today are
registered as both an FCM and as a BD.21
Pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.17, the firm must
maintain “adjusted net capital” that is equal to or
greater than the sum of customer (8%) and noncustomer (4%) required margin requirements. In
the event that the net capital amount determined
pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.17 is greater than the
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amount required under SEC Rule 15c3-1, the
firm must meet the greater of these two amounts.
In determining its minimum net capital requirements pursuant to the applicable regulations
noted above, the firm’s assets must be valued conservatively, with most financial assets having their
value discounted, using value at risk or scenario
analysis, to provide a conservative assessment of
their market value.

Reporting Requirements
Under applicable rules, a broker-dealer/FCM
must provide the SEC, the CFTC, FINRA, the National Futures Association (“NFA”) and its designated examining authority and its designated selfregulatory organization (DSRO) (for most large
U.S. brokerage firms, this would be FINRA in
their broker-dealer capacity and the CME in their
FCM capacity) with same-day notice if its regulatory capital drops below the “early warning”
level (a multiple of the net capital requirements
mandated by SEC Rule 15c3-1 and CFTC Rule
1.17). Similarly, if at any time the firm’s regulatory tentative net capital declines by 20% or more
from the last month-end, that firm must, in accordance with applicable SEC and CFTC regulations,
immediately notify these regulators regarding this
change. The “early warning” requirements effectively provide an advance indication of potential
financial stress that a broker-dealer/FCM may
incur and are set significantly above the level at
which a broker-dealer/FCM must maintain its
minimum net capital requirements.

The Lehman Events
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. (“LB Holdings”), the holding company of all Lehman Brothers entities and the publicly-traded company (NYSE symbol: LEH) filed
a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York.22 Its principal U.S. subsidiary, Lehman
Brothers Inc. (“LBI”), a registered broker-dealer
and FCM, did not file its petition (a Chapter 7
filing) until the following weekend. The principal
U.K. affiliate of LB Holdings, Lehman Brothers
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International (Europe) (“LBIE”), also submitted
its filing on September 15th. The U.K. Financial
Services Authority (“FSA”) appointed Price Waterhouse Coopers (“PWC”) as the Administrator
for LBIE. This is similar to the role of a trustee in
bankruptcy had LBI made such a filing.
LBI had opened a Customer Omnibus Account on the books of LBIE to permit LBI futures customers to trade on the various European
exchanges. LBIE was either directly a general
clearing member firm (“GCM”) on the clearing
houses in Europe, such as LCH Clearnet SA and
EUREX Clearing AG, or had established their
own customer omnibus accounts on the books of
a third party clearing firm on other European exchanges. LBI was the clearing member firm on the
U.S. futures exchanges and had opened a futures
customer omnibus account with other Lehman
Brothers affiliates or third party clearing firms in
Canada and Asia. LBIE had opened a customer
omnibus account on the books of LBI to allow its
futures customers to trade on the U.S., Canadian
and Asian markets. All futures customer accounts
were opened with either LBI or LBIE.23 Note that
LBIE had many direct futures accounts opened
on its books, including some accounts, especially
hedge fund accounts, that involved a prime brokerage and cross margin netting arrangement.
LBI had similar arrangements with hedge funds
on its books but also had a large number of futures-only accounts that were managed by large
investment advisory firms.
As noted above, the concept of segregated
funds is designed to protect the cash and collateral deposited by futures customers to margin
their futures positions. These regulations do not
directly address the actual futures positions themselves. Given the uncertainty of the situation and
the volatility in the marketplace, senior Lehman
futures officials worked closely with their futures
clients and governmental and exchange officials
to transfer the client futures positions to other
clearing firms in order to provide these customers
with a new home that was properly capitalized.
This process started immediately after LB Holdings filed its petition for bankruptcy in the U.S.
but not so outside the U.S. PWC, as the newly-appointed Administrator, did not permit the trans-
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fer of the open futures positions until late in the
day on Wednesday, September 17th, with the vast
majority of the futures positions being transferred
on Thursday, September 18th or Friday, September 19th.
Most of the futures positions held by Lehman’s
customers, whether they were held on the books
of LBI or LBIE, were either moved to other clearing member firms per the instructions of such
customers by the close of business on Friday, September 19th, or they became futures customers of
Barclays Capital Inc. (“BCI”), the U.S. affiliate of
Barclays Bank PLC. BCI acquired all of the remaining futures customer accounts on the books
of LBI after the close of business on September
19th. Therefore, the system worked for the most
part although, as noted above, quicker action was
needed. Through the tremendous efforts of many
governmental agencies, SROs, firms, exchanges,
clearing houses and clients, the goal of transferring the open futures positions was effectively
achieved within five days. This reflects the strong
working relationships that exist within the global
futures community. No other product area or industry can make a similar claim.
RECOMMENDATION #3: In the future, it is
imperative that any trustee in bankruptcy or administrator that is selected should have a strong
futures product knowledge and expertise to allow prompt and immediate transfers of futures
positions. Granted, in today’s marketplace, prime
brokerage accounts and corresponding Cross
Margin Netting Agreements (“CMNA”) play a
critical role relating to the required funding of the
risk margin amounts that control multiple products, including futures accounts, but many futures
accounts are stand alone accounts without any
prime brokerage (“PB”) or CMNA agreements
in place. Accordingly, the margin amounts held
in such stand alone accounts will not have been
used to finance other related financial transactions and products, such as via a PB or portfolio
margining arrangement. All customer omnibus
accounts fall within this parameter and must be
treated differently than other futures accounts
that are highly correlated with other products and
PB arrangements. The product expertise for such
appointees related to futures is critical, and such
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appointees, even if they are only granted certain
limited powers over futures accounts, must have
a thorough knowledge of the global futures markets. Customer protection is the most important
goal, and futures positions need to be moved in
a very timely manner, especially during a volatile
marketplace.
Sadly, some European and Asian exchanges
took a different path to resolving the issue before
them. Even though the accounts were labeled as
customer omnibus accounts on their books, they
chose to simply liquidate the open futures positions and not participate in any position transfers. Such liquidations came with little or no prior
notice to Lehman officials. This should never be
allowed again.
RECOMMENDATION #4: It is very important
that every global exchange recognize the concept
of a customer omnibus account or create a special
coding on their exchange operational system that
can easily identify which positions belong to customers and which positions belong to the clearing
member’s proprietary traders. Once positions are
identified as belonging to a customer of a clearing
member or their carrying brokers, these customer
positions should not be liquidated but should be
allowed to be moved to another firm unless, of
course, the client seeks such liquidation. The exchange is protected financially as it can liquidate
the clearing firm’s proprietary positions and can
thus hold these proceeds to protect against a market move in the positions held by the customers or
can even issue an increased margin call. To merely liquidate open customer positions promptly
without providing alternative approaches to the
solution is not an acceptable practice and should
not be allowed. This is especially troublesome in
today’s marketplace as a large number of futures
positions are used to hedge against some stock or
bond portfolios. By liquidating one leg of these
positions, given the market volatility that occurred, some clients incurred even greater damage
to their portfolio. Actions taken by an exchange
or clearing house to liquidate all customer open
positions without first providing an opportunity
to have these positions transferred, even if permitted by their rules, should be guarded and not used
without greater forethought.
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RECOMMENDATION #5: The CFTC and
the FSA should consider and establish policies,
and perhaps regulations, that require any global
futures exchange that holds positions for customers of FCMs in the U.S. or registered investment
entities (“RIEs”) in the U.K. to contact the CFTC
and the FSA, respectively, before the exchange
takes actions to liquidate all customer positions.
The CFTC and the FSA could require, via a
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”), that
such exchanges notify them in the event an exchange elects to take actions to liquidate all open
customer positions.
RECOMMENDATION #6: Regulations need
to be established to provide better customer protections for the actual positions held by futures
customers globally. As noted above, current regulations only address the cash and collateral used
to margin these positions. However, when major
events occur, like they did over the weekend of
September 12-14, the resulting market volatility
caused significant harm to end users who were
not able to liquidate their open positions. Regulations need to establish proper guidelines and
procedures that an administrator or trustee in
bankruptcy must follow to permit the prompt release of open futures positions that are not part
of any PB or other risk-based financing arrangement, and to require the exchanges to act accordingly, all in the best interests of the end users of
the global futures markets.
RECOMMENDATION #7: The global futures
industry is just one small part of the total investment landscape. Many products in today’s marketplace are intertwined within a total risk portfolio. This reflects the significant growth of prime
brokerage globally and the growing concept of
portfolio margining. Because different products
are so correlated to each other, especially from a
risk margin and financing perspective, it is very
important that all of these products be treated
in a similar manner under new bankruptcy laws
and regulations that are clearly now needed. Such
laws and regulations must be adopted globally.
This requires all of the major countries to meet
together to address this global problem. A future
with 15 or 20 different sets of laws and regulations is not a very bright one. While uniformity
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is not needed, commonality of elements and their
corresponding interpretations are. A global set
of bankruptcy laws and regulations that relate
specifically to the insolvency of global brokerage
firms and banks are now needed.
While open futures positions were, for the most
part, transferred within the first five days, the cash
and collateral used to margin those positions were
not timely transferred. While part of the delay resulted from some difficulty in the accounting and
trade confirmation processes, some banks simply
refused to transfer the amounts held in customer
protected accounts in a timely manner. For example, JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, the U.S. bank
that held all of the cash and collateral in the LBI
Customer Segregated Account, stopped releasing
customer funds on Thursday, September 18th and
continued this “hold” for many more days. Eventually, it agreed to transfer the cash and collateral
held in the Customer Segregated Account.
RECOMMENDATION #8: Actions taken by
banks that did not release funds in a timely manner were unacceptable.24 There is no probable
cause to place a “hold” by such banks on segregated funds. Such banks have signed a “segregated acknowledgement” letter, which clearly states
that the bank acknowledges and agrees that the
amounts held in a Customer Segregated Account
belong solely to the futures customers of the respective FCM and do not belong to any creditors
of that FCM or custodial bank. By taking such
actions, banks required the end users, in essence,
to “double segregate” by depositing new margin
amounts at their new clearing firms. The additional funding requirement adversely impacted
their liquidity performance and return and should
not have occurred.
RECOMMENDATION #9: The CFTC, NFA,
FSA and the respective clearing houses should
carefully review the entire process of account
movement during stressed situations, establish
proper guidelines and procedures to require custodial banks, that act in this capacity on behalf
of futures customers on a global basis, to transfer customer protected funds in a very timely
manner and take enforcement actions against
banks that refuse to act in the best interests of
the customers.
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PWC, the Administrator for LBIE, issued a
statement on October 7, 2008, stating it was still
reviewing how to deal with requests for transfer
of client monies and assets. PWC gave no indication as to when such client assets would be distributed. Other firms appointed to serve as the
trustee in bankruptcy in other jurisdictions have
also not released any of the funds held in the LBI
Customer Omnibus Account on the books of
LBIE and other non-U.S. Lehman affiliates. In Japan, for example, the bankruptcy-appointed firm
indicated that it would not announce any decision regarding releasing the funds held in LBI’s
customer segregated account until after November 17, 2008.
RECOMMENDATION #10: As noted above,
the customer omnibus account of a U.S. FCM
should receive prompt payment of any amounts
held in such accounts in those countries that the
CFTC deem to be a good control location over
customer funds, once the open positions have
been transferred to another clearing member. The
CFTC, together with the industry and other foreign governmental agencies, need to review these
procedures and establish new guidelines on how
such omnibus accounts should be treated. Once
the open positions held in a customer omnibus
account have been transferred away, then the
funds held to margin those positions should be
promptly transferred back to such customers or
their new clearing member firms.
RECOMMENDATION #11: Customer funds
held by a brokerage firm or exchange in a country that is deemed to be a good secured location
pursuant to CFTC regulations should not be
deemed to be subject to the claims of a creditor
of the brokerage firm that has filed for bankruptcy and should be protected against such claims.
The CFTC should consider whether a non-US
exchange, that permits a U.S. FCM to open a customer omnibus account on the books of a clearing member firm of that exchange, should be required to open special bank accounts with a U.S.
bank or DCO to hold such initial margin within
the U.S. and be subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code and Part 190 of the CFTC Regulations in
order to facilitate the transfer of such customer
funds in a timely manner.
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RECOMMENDATION #12: The CFTC and
the NFA, together with other governments and
industry associations, should establish a task
force that includes members from the industry
and the end user community to determine what
new best practices are now needed in the event
such a global bankruptcy event ever occurs again.
The last such industry task force was established
after the Barings collapse in the mid-1990s.
There has been considerable change in the way
the industry operates since then, in particular the
wide-spread use of PB arrangements and new risk
management analyses for funding a wide array of
financial products. The new task force should
consist of a global committee that creates several
sub-committees, each having jurisdiction and responsibility over a specific issue or concern.
RECOMMENDATION #13: The current caps
on FDIC insurance (currently, $100,000)25 and
SIPC ($500,000) are being reviewed for possible
increases. The futures industry and the CFTC
should meet to determine whether an insurance
program is now needed for futures accounts.
SIPA specifically excludes futures accounts. However, in light of the actions taken by some of the
global exchanges in connection with Lehman’s
bankruptcy, there is a need to determine whether
such an insurance program is now viable and can
be properly funded.

Conclusion
As noted above, the process and procedures
that followed the filing of Lehman’s bankruptcy
did not always flow as well as many believed it
should have. The industry and government need
to establish a task force that addresses these issues
and determine what changes and best practices, if
any, are now needed to minimize the impact on
customers in the event another such bankruptcy
ever occurs.
NOTES
1. 2008, Ronald H. Filler. Printed with permission.
“CFTC” stands for the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, the U.S. governmental
agency in charge of regulating the U.S. futures
markets and U.S. industry professionals.
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2.	Special recognition goes to Acting CFTC
Chairman Walt Lukken, NFA President Dan
Roth and many other senior CFTC and NFA staff
members who provided tremendous assistance
to help the futures customers of Lehman
Brothers Inc. throughout this period.
3. Another FCM has recently been the subject
of bankruptcy proceedings. See Sentinel
Management Group, Inc. (U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division (Case No. 07 B 14987) but this
proceeding involved a different set of issues and
did not involve transactions in futures contracts.
Bear was taken over by J.P. Morgan Bank, with
the assistance of the Federal Reserve Bank, in
March 2008.
4.
A broker-dealer must maintain its securities
customer assets in compliance with the SEC’s
“customer protection rule” (Rule 15c3-3),
including maintaining cash in a special reserve
account and maintaining fully paid and excess
margin securities in a segregated account. In
general, the securities accounts maintained
at a BD will receive the benefit of expedited
administration and the right to recover up to
US$100,000 in cash or US$500,000 in securities
if its broker-dealer were to become insolvent.
Under such a scenario, customer assets held
in a securities account would be administered
pursuant to a proceeding brought by the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC)
pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection
Act (SIPA). If the BD were also registered as
an FCM, futures customers should understand,
however, that SIPA rules specifically exclude
futures customer accounts and their assets from
its provisions. Most BDs have purchased a surety
bond that provides protection in excess of the
amounts provided under SIPC. However, this
surety bond would, like SIPA, be limited to only
the broker-dealer securities accounts and would
not apply to the futures customer assets held by
a joint BD-FCM.
5. 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
6.	See CFTC Regulations 1.20 and 30.7
7. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2)
8. “Good control location” is mainly a term used by
broker-dealers pursuant to SEC regulations but
its meaning here implies an account established
in accordance with CFTC regulations.
9.	See Interpretative Statement issued by the CFTC
on September 26, 2008, regarding funds related
to cleared-only contracts.
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10. For those jurisdictions (e.g., Germany, Hong
Kong, Korea) that do not provide the standard
customer asset protection that requires the
separation of a Firm’s proprietary assets from
its customer assets, the FCM may deposit a
corresponding amount of its own capital in a
good control location, typically in the accounts
at its respective custodial bank, to reflect the
amounts as determined in its 30.7 daily secured
amount calculation (based on the amount for
that trade date), in its UK FSA segregation daily
calculation (based on the amount as determined
on the trade date plus one day) and in its weekly
15c3-3 weekly calculation. This form of “double
segregation” provides significant protections to
an FCM’s futures customers.
11.	Note that, pursuant to applicable CFTC
regulations, an FCM is required to deposit
all customer cash and securities in a customer
segregated fund account but, in reality, is not
required to place customer assets in a secured
amount account. It can elect to use its own
capital to meet the minimum secured amount
requirements.
12. If the FCM is also registered as a brokerdealer, then these non-regulated accounts are
maintained in accordance with SEC Rule 15c33. The Customer Reserve Formula calculation
required by SEC Rule 15c3-3 is performed
weekly, typically on each Monday reflecting
the amounts as of the previous Friday’s close
of business. The assets held in this account can
not be commingled with the FCM’s proprietary
funds and are maintained in a designated Special
Custody Account for the “Exclusive Benefit of
Customers” (EBOC Account) at a designated
custodial bank.
13.	See Note 4, supra.
14.	See CFTC Regulation 1.20 which states in
essence: “All customer funds shall be separately
accounted for and segregated as belonging
to commodity or option customers. Such
customer funds when deposited with any
bank, trust company, clearing organization or
another futures commission merchant shall be
deposited under an account name which clearly
identifies them as such and shows that they are
segregated as required by the Act and this part.”
CFTC Regulation 30.7 contains similar language
regarding the treatment of foreign futures and
options secured amount accounts.
15.	See CFTC Regulation 1.17.
16. For a more detailed explanation of applicable
laws and regulations affecting the bankruptcy
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17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

of an FCM, see Subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and Part 190 of the
CFTC Regulations.
Pursuant to CFTC Rule 1.25, an FCM may rehypothecate customer funds provided that, at
all times, an equivalent amount of the funds
being re-hypothecated are maintained in the
customer segregated account.
This view has been expressed by many industry
observers but is not directly covered by any CFTC
regulation.
The Reserve Fund “broke the buck” in September
2008, and many other such funds halted
redemptions for a 7-day period as permitted by
their prospectus. On September 22, 2008, the
SEC, pursuant to Section 22(e) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the ‘40 Act”) issued an
order temporarily suspending redemptions and
postponing payment of shares of two series
of The Reserve Fund -- The Primary Fund and
The U.S. Government Fund. On September 29,
2008, the Board of Trustees of The Reserve
Fund announced that it would liquidate the
assets of The Primary Fund. (See Release No.
28386). See also CFTC Staff Interpretative
Letter issued on September 24, 2008, to Debra
Kokal, Chairman of the Joint Audit Committee.
Also, on September 29th, the U.S. Treasury
Department announced that it was opening
its Temporary Guarantee Program for Money
Market Funds (Press Release hp-1161). In the
release, the Treasury Department stated that it
will guarantee the share price of any publicly
offered eligible public money market fund that
is regulated under SEC Rule 2a-7 under the 1940
Act for amounts held by shareholders as of
September 19th.
After T+3 days, a capital charge is assessed
against the FCM for failing to collect the
required margin amount.
A few, including Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley
and Merrill Lynch, were also once licensed as a
consolidated supervisory entity (“CSE”). The
SEC suspended the CSE program on September
26, 2008. See SEC Release 2008-230. A key
protection to customers is the special regime
applicable to CSEs under the SEC’s and CFTC’s
respective “net capital” rules (SEC Rule 15c3-1
and CFTC Rule 1.17). As a CSE, the firm would
calculate its net capital requirement pursuant to
Appendix E to SEC Rule 15c3-1, which establishes
alternative net capital requirements and allows
the CSE firm to use SEC-approved value at risk
or scenario analysis models to calculate and
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remain in compliance with the SEC and CFTC
net capital requirements. The CSE net capital
rules effectively require that the CSE firm must
maintain at least US $500 million in “adjusted
net capital” and US$1 billion in “tentative net
capital” in order to continue operations. This
calculation does not include customer-owned
securities.
22. Case No. 08-13555. The petition was filed
following a special meeting of the Board of
Directors of Holdings on September 14, 2008.
On September 19, 2008, LBI filed a proceeding
under the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970 (Case No. 08-01420). See also Statement
issued by SIPC on September 15, 2008.
23.	Over this same weekend, Merrill Lynch was
acquired by the Bank of America and American
International Group (“AIG”) received a $85
billion loan from the U.S. Treasury. All of these
events and other similar concerns created huge
volatility in the global markets all at once. During
this same period, many banks refused to issue
credit to other financial institutions, including
other banks. Over the weekend of September
19-21, 2008, the U.S. Treasury announced its $700
billion bailout which received Congressional
approval on October 3, 2008.
24.	Section 4d(b) of the CEA states in essence: “It
shall be unlawful for any person, including but
not limited to any clearing agency of a contract
market or derivatives transaction execution
facility and any depository, that has received
any money, securities, or property for deposit in
a separate account as provided in paragraph 2
of this section, to hold, dispose of, or use any
such money, securities, or property as belonging
to the depositing futures commission merchant
or any person other than customers of such
futures commission merchant.” 7 U.S.C. § 6d(b).
25. FDIC insurance was increased to $250,000.00
on a temporary basis through December 2009
pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 passed on October 3, 2008.
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